RECENT CASES
Bankruptcy-Exemptions-Validity of Assignment to Creditor of Property Later
to Be Exempted in Bankruptcy-[Federal].--Within four months prior to bankruptcy
the bankrupt gave the plaintiff creditor two notes in which the debtor purported to
"transfer, assign, and convey" a sufficient amoufit of his "homestead and exemption"
to pay the debts owed the plaintiff. The notes also provided that "In case of bankruptcy, the holder ....of this note is appointed attorney in fact to claim .... all
homestead exemption allowed by law." In his original schedule in involuntarybankruptcy, the debtor claimed the homestead exemption of $16oo (Ga. Code 1933, c. 51,
§ ioi). The plaintiff filed his claim on the notes, assignments and powers of attorney,
joining with the bankrupt in his application for exemption and alleging title to the exemption. After the trustee had separated the property designated by the debtor and
sold it as exempt, but before the trustee filed his report or the sale was confirmed and
the exemption formally set apart, the bankrupt renounced his exemption claim. The
plaintiff protested the disclaimer and sought to require the trustee to report the property as exempt. The referee thought the bankrupt's renunciation effective. This decision was reversed by the district court. In the circuit court, held, reversal affirmed.
Under the laws of Georgia, the assignment of the exempted property was valid and the
plaintiff's preferred position could not be defeated after the bankrupt had claimed
the exemption and the property was set apart physically. Kronstadt v. Citizens and
Southern Nat'l Bank of Savannah, 8o F. (2d) 260 (C.C.A. 5 th 1935).
Under § 6 of the Bankruptcy Act the bankruptcy courts are bound to follow state
exemption laws. 30 Stat. 548 (i898), 1i U. S. C. A. § 24 (926). Georgia law provides
that a debtor who is head of a family, etc., may secure an exemption of $i6oo worth of
property by formal application to the Court of Ordinary. Ga. Code 1933, C. 51, § 2.
The same exemption mav be secured in bankruptcy. Broach v. Powell, 79 Ga. 79,
3 S.E. 763 (1887). A debtor may by special provision in his notes waive his right to
have his exemptions later set aside. Ga. Code 1933, c. 51, § iI. If he does so, the waiver-note holder may obtain judgment and levy execution on any of the debtor's property whether set aside as exempt or not. Dickens v. Breedlove, 34 Ga. App. 459, z29
S.E. 886 (1925); Anderson v. Ashford & Co., 374 Ga. 66o, 163 S.E. 741 (x934). A bankrupt may, by failing to claim or by renouncing his claim before the exemption is formally set apart in bankruptcy, defeat the waiver-creditor's possibility of a preference.
In re Bowers, 278 Fed. 681 (D.C. Ga. 1922), aff'd sub nom. McWhorter v. Barnes, 283
Fed. 1022 (C.C.A. 5 th 1922). Under the authority of a growing group of cases, a
debtor may also "assign" and "convey" his exemption to a creditor either before or
after the exempted property is set aside in bankruptcy. Strickland Hardware Co. v.
Fetcher, 152 Ga. 445, 11o S.E. 229 (1921); Saul v. Bowers, 155 Ga. 450, 117 S.E. 86
(1923); Martin v. Citizens' Bank, 17o Ga. 717, 128 S.E. 785 (1923); Livingston v.
Epstein-Roberts Co., 5o Ga. App. 25, 177 S.E. 79 (1934). An assignment before bankruptcy will operate as a valid transfer against the bankrupt's general creditors of whatever property is later set apart in bankruptcy. StricklandHardwareCo. v. Fletcher,152
Ga. 445, 11o S.E. 229 (1921). It will also prevail over holders of prior waiver notes
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(Norrisv. Aikens, 155 Ga. 488, 117 S.E. 248 (1923)), and against a creditor who has
secured an assignment from the bankrupt after the property was set aside. Said v.
Bowers, 155 Ga. 450, 117 S.E. 86 (1923). However, Georgia decisions have never made
clear whether an "assignment" is a transfer of property later to be set apart or an assignment of the right to claim the exemption in bankruptcy. See Martinv. Citizens'
Bank, 17o Ga. 18o, 152 S.E. 234 (1930); cf. Citizens Bank v. PendergrassBanking Co.,
164 Ga. 302, 138 S.E. 223 (1927). Hence the federal courts were free to hold, as they
did, that the bankrupt himself could defeat an assignment, otherwise valid, by failing
to claim or by renouncing his claim to his exemption at any time before it was formally
set apart to him. In re Martin Bros., 294 Fed. 368 (D.C. Ga. 1923); In re Herrin
West, 215 Fed. 250 (D.C. Ga. 1914); see In re Anderson, 224 Fed. 790 (D.C. Ga. 1915).
And the Georgia Supreme Court has in dicta admitted that possibility, even while insisting that the exemption, upon being set apart in bankruptcy, passed automatically
to the assignee. See Strickland Hardware Co. v. Fletcher, 152 Ga. 445, 449, iio S.E.
229, 231 (1921); Saul v. Bowers, 155 Ga. 450, 456, 117 S.E. 86, 89 (3923). The federal
decisions show the reluctance of bankruptcy courts to administer exempt property for
the benefit of a particular creditor. An attitude unfavorable to the assignee would be
expected especially where the assignment was within four months of bankruptcy and
would have amounted to a voidable preference if it had transferred non-exempt property.
The court in the instant case seemed impressed with the assignee's precarious position. But it failed to make clear its reasons for holding contra to the above federal decisions. Since the exempted property had here been physically set apart, perhaps the
court thought that the assignee's "equitable" or "inchoate" interest had become legal
and fixed. But a holding that the property is irrevocably set apart before the trustee
has filed his report is hard to reconcile with the usual allowance of a twenty-day period
after the filing for objections by general creditors to the bankrupt's claim of exemption.
General Orders in Bankruptcy XVII. This difficulty could be avoided on the theory
that the mere "inchoate" interest of the assignee, though defeasible by general creditors on proper objections, was valid as against the bankrupt himself as soon as the
latter had originally claimed his exemption. A still further possibility is that the assignment or the power of attorney in the instant case gave the creditor the right to
claim the exemption originally and that the transfer of such a right or power was irrevocable from the time made. In most jurisdictions the right to claim is strictly personal to the bankrupt. In re Schuller, io8 Fed. 591 (D.C. Wis. igoi); Mitchell v.
Mitchell, 147 Fed. 280 (D.C. N.C. x9o6); In re French,231 Fed. 255 (D.C. N.Y. 1916);
In re Baughman, 183 Fed. 668 (D.C. Pa. 191o). In Georgia, the right to claim exemption in bankruptcy developed from the right of the debtor to apply formally to the
state courts for his exemption (Ga. Code 1933, c. 51-2); thus the statute provides only
for the debtor (Ga. Code 1933, c. 51-201) or his wife to claim. Ga. Code 1933, c. 51702. But the Georgia Supreme Court decisions have struggled to make assignments
prior to bankruptcy effective security devices and obviously, if the assignee cannot
himself claim exemption in bankruptcy, his security is illusory. Moreover, there
would be no justification for holding that a bankrupt's renunciation is ineffective
against a prior assignment, but that he may defeat that assignment by failing to claim
originally. It would seem logical therefore to hold that an assignment, accompanied
by a power of attorney, is sufficient to give the assignee the right to claim. Michigan
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bankruptcy courts have reached that conclusion on the basis of a Michigan statute
which provides that an exemption may be claimed by the bankrupt, or "by an authorized agent." In re Nat'l Grocer Co., r8i Fed. 33 (D.C. Mich. x91o). Iowa bankruptcy
courts have reached the same result apparently on the construction of more general
statutes. Weber v. Lorenzen, 292 Fed. 41 (C.C.A. 8th 1923); Moody v. Century Bank,
239 U.S. 374 (1915).
It might be argued that a power of attorney to claim an exemption is revocable because not "coupled with an interest" in the thing on which the power is to be exercised. However, the modem trend has been to recognize as irrevocable all powers given
as security except in a situation where such a result is thought unduly prejudicial to the
interests of other creditors. 39 Yale L. J. 110 (1929); Rest., Agency §§ 138,139 (1933).
Constitutional Law-Constitutionality of New York Anti-Heart Balm Legislation[New York].-The plaintiff brought an action for alienation of his wife's affections.
The defendant moved for a dismissal on the grounds that the action had been abolished
by a New York statute, in force at the time of the alleged injury, which provides that
the "rights of action heretofore existing to recover ....
damages for the alienation of
affections, criminal conversation, seduction, or breach of contract to marry are hereby
abolished." N.Y.L. 1935, c. 263, §§ 6ia-6ii. Held, motion for dismissal denied. The
statute, is far as applicable to this action, is unconstitutional as a denial of due process
under both the federal and New York constitutions. Hanfgarn v. Marks, U.S. Law
Week, March io, 1936, p. 6.
Six states have abolished heart balm actions (see 3 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 68 (1935)),
but the instant case presents the first test of the constitutionality of such legislation.
The result of the principal case finds precedent in other situations in which courts have
refused to permit the total extinction of common law rights and remedies by legislative enactment. See Williams v. Port Chester, 72 App. Div. 5o5, 510, 76 N.Y.S. 631
635 (1902); Hanson v. Krehbiel, 68 Kans. 670, 75 Pac. io41 (I9O4); cf. Hiemlich v.
DispatchPrintingCo., 17 (Ohio) N.P. (n.s.) i6i, x69 (1915); Stewart v. Houk, 127 Ore.
589, 271 Pac. 998 (1928). The basis for these decisions has been a free application
either of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or of the common law
doctrine that there can be no wrong without a remedy. MacMullen v. City of Middletown, 112 App. Div. 81, 98 N.Y.S. I45 (igo6), rev'd on other grounds, 187 N.Y. 37, 79
N.E. 863 (1907); Park v. DetroitFree Press, 72 Mich. 560, 40 N.W. 730 (i888); see 69
U.S. L. Rev. 474, 484 (1935); see Broom, Legal Maxims 147 (6th Am. ed. i868). This
maxim has become a constitutional rule by virtue of express or implied incorporation
into state constitutions. Byers v. Meridan PrintingCo., 84 Ohio St. 408, 95 N.E. 917
(191I); MacMulle v. City of Middletown, 112 App. Div. 8i, 86, 98 N.Y.S. 145, 149
(19o6). But there has been no constitutional objection to a "reasonable modification"
of common law rights or remedies. New York CentralRy. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188
(1917); Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326 (1933). Upon this ground, the constitutionality of workmen's compensation acts has been upheld even though the amount
of recoverable damages was limited, and no compensation at all was allowed for
particular types of injury. Hyett v. Northwestern Hospital, 147 Minn. 413, i8o N.W.
552 (1920). Likewise, statutes destroying the action of an auto guest for the "ordinary" negligence of his host have been sustained on the theory that there has been
a change merely in the standard of care required of the host and that a common law

